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Abstract: The world of audiovisual online markets is rapidly changing. Not long ago, it was 
dominated by linear television, transmitted terrestrially, through cable networks or via satel-
lite. Recently, streaming services like Netflix, YouTube, Amazon Prime and others have 
emerged as new suppliers of audiovisual content. In this quickly changing industry, compe-
tition interrelations between such different formats like traditional TV, videos on YouTube, 
and streaming via Netflix are subject to controversy. In particular, doubt is cast on services 
like YouTube exerting competitive pressure on services like Netflix and traditional TV. Based 
upon a survey with almost 3,000 participants, we provide an empirical analysis of consump-
tion behavior of audiovisual contents. Using descriptive and analytical statistics, including 
multiple equation models, we show that there are specific areas within audiovisual content 
markets where YouTube exerts considerable competitive pressure on both Netflix and classic 
TV, for instance, through prime time video entertainment. However, our analysis yields dif-
ferentiated results as we also identify areas where competition intensity between different 
service types appear to be low, for instance, through daytime and regarding the intention 
to shorten waiting time. 
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1. Introduction
The consumption of audiovisual content is rapidly changing. While traditional tele-
vision (TV) still dominates the consumption of audiovisual contents of an older age 
audience, the younger ages already devote more time to consuming audiovisual 
contents via online streaming services and video portals like Netflix or YouTube (al-
so referred to as video-on-demand; VoD). This development is also driven by an 
increased use of mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets, allowing for con-
siderably enhanced options of consuming audiovisual contents in not only the liv-
ing room at home but also virtually everywhere and every time. User figures and 
viewing numbers from various countries show that particularly younger genera-
tions extensively use portals like YouTube and watch online streaming services like 
Netflix, whereas older age groups (50+ years) significantly less switch on these ser-
vices (see, inter alia, for Germany Lindstädt-Dreusicke & Budzinski 2020, for Scandi-
navia Audience Project 2019, for the UK Fisher 2019, and for the US Richter 2019). 
At the same time, traditional television is not only relatively stronger with the older 
population (e.g. due to a lack of mobile consumption of non-TV contents like 
YouTube videos) but also in absolute terms. In 2019, the average daily viewing time 
of television in the 50+ age groups amounted to 318 minutes per day, whereas the 
30-49 years-old watched 176 minutes per day and the 14-29 years-old only 82
minutes per day. Also, consumption time in the older age group slightly increased 
whereas it decreased in the younger age clusters, particularly within the 30-49 
years old (-18 minutes per day compared to previous year) (Statista 2020). Thus, 
the figures do not allow disentangling how much of the dynamics results from 
complementary services in the mobile online world and how much from viewers 
abandoning traditional television and switching to various VoD formats.  
In line with the more widespread usability of mobile internet, some of the online 
services are predominantly popular for shorter video contents like YouTube, where-
as others (like Netflix) mirror more closely the content that traditional television is 
broadcasting. The types of contents differ in various regards including average 
lengths of videos, share of sequels and movies, entertainment categories, extent of 
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exclusive and/or original content1, etc. VoD, in general, differs from TV in that there 
is no fixed program schedule as a take-it-or-leave offer for consumers. Instead, VoD 
consumers can watch all available contents whenever they want and compile their 
“program” by themselves. The media literature calls the schedule-bound service 
linear and the on-demand type non-linear (inter alia, Berman et al. 2009; Kazakova 
& Cauberghe 2013; Steemers 2014; van den Bulck & Enli 2014; Simons 2015; Enli & 
Syvertsen 2016).  
The currently relevant online services differ in terms of business models from both 
traditional TV and from each other. In terms of business models, advertised-
financed streaming services (AVoD; e.g. YouTube) can be distinguished from paid-
for (by users) streaming services (PVoD; e.g. Netflix) (Lindstädt-Dreusicke & 
Budzinski 2020). While it is possible that streaming services mix these models (i.e. 
hybrid models, like Spotify is doing in respect to audio streaming services), at the 
time of our empirical analysis (winter 2018/19), the relevant suppliers in the Ger-
man market were predominantly devoted to one of the two models.2 Obviously, 
business models will develop and change along with the high dynamics of the mar-
kets in question. Therefore, for the purpose of our analysis, we decided to directly 
pick two of the most prominent online services for the consumption of audiovisual 
contents, namely YouTube and Netflix, and compare them to traditional television 
(the latter with almost no dynamics regarding the main providers; Budzinski & 
Lindstädt-Dreusicke 2020). While YouTube was and remains an obvious choice, it is 
1  Netflix and Amazon Prime Video for instance, as well as new players, such as Disney+ and Apple 
TV+ that just recently entered the VoD sector aim at attracting their audience especially with 
original (own produced) programming (e.g. Netflix with House of Cards or Orange is the New 
Black) or at least content, where they hold exclusive rights for (inter alia, Aguiar & Waldfogel 
2018; Benes 2019). By doing so, they both create a competitive advantage over other VoD pro-
viders and also make a clear comparability of different VoD services for the users more difficult. 
2  YouTube started its paid-for service only in mid-2018, just before our data was collected, but it 
was hardly known or used at the time (YouTube Official Blog 2018). Moreover, until today, 
YouTube is predominantly known for its AVoD service. In addition to this, it had been announced 
in September 2019 that a lot of own productions that had been set behind the Premium Paywall 
will be moved to the advertising-financed section of YouTube, leading to speculations about the 
success and performance of the paid-for service offer (Meedia 2019). Joyn, a VoD service by 
ProSiebenSat.1. and Discovery started in June 2019 with an AVoD model only and just switched 
to a hybrid model of both advertising and user financing at the end of 2019, both after our data 
had been collected. TV Now, a hybrid service by the RTL Group had been existent before, howev-
er, had little meaning in the German VoD market compared to the market leaders Netflix and 
Amazon Prime Video and just in 2019 announced massive investments in its video streaming ac-
tivities for the next three years (Krei 2019, W&V 2019).  
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not that obvious regarding PVoD-services. According to the Audience Project 
(2019), Netflix is taking the leading position among the most used streaming and 
downloading services for the US, UK, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway. For 
the US and Germany, Netflix is followed by Amazon Prime Video, whereas in the UK 
the BBC iPlayer takes the second position from Amazon Prime Video. In the Scandi-
navian countries, by contrast, Amazon Prime Video plays a fairly little role. Virtually 
all available market share figures assume separate markets for services like YouTube 
and PVoD streaming services (thus, ignoring YouTube when calculating shares for 
Netflix and co). As of October 2019, market shares according to subscription fig-
ures in Germany display Amazon Prime Video (47 percent) leading from Netflix (36 
percent) with other providers clearly lacking behind (e.g Sky with 5.9 percent) 
(Herrmann 2019). However, Amazon ties its Prime subscription to a bundle of dif-
ferent services (e.g. free shipping, next day delivery, music streaming, video stream-
ing), thus, it is not clear how many people exactly use Amazons VoD offer (El 
Khaoudi 2018). Based on daily usage figures, Netflix is leading the market in Ger-
many, followed by Amazon Prime Video (Herrmann 2019). 
Despite the differences in content, business models and treatment by available em-
pirical studies, at the end of the day, all of TV, AVoD and PVoD are offering audio-
visual contents to the consumers. In the light of the increasing importance of 
online streaming services vis-à-vis traditional TV, therefore, the questions arise 
whether relevant competitive pressure between the services (in our study repre-
sented by YouTube, Netflix, TV) exists. We specify this general research question by, 
more precisely, inquiring whether the intensity of competitive pressure depends on 
specific characteristics of demand, i.e. (i) for whom (e.g. age groups), (ii) during 
what time of the day (e.g. prime time), and (iii) for what purposes (e.g. genre, mo-
tivation/intention). In order to tackle our research questions, we empirically analyze 
the audiovisual viewing patters by employing an econometric analysis based on a 
quantitative online survey in Germany. With a unique dataset of almost 3,000 par-
ticipants, we are able to provide differentiated results on age groups, choices 
through different times of day and consumption differences regarding genres and 
intentions. The rich data set provides wide information on stated and pseudo-
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revealed preferences3 of respondents, i.e. direct answers stating the respondent’s 
opinion and preferences in agreement with self-perception versus indirect ques-
tions revealing preferences and ideas the respondent might not directly be aware 
of. We are able to show that those preferences diverge. While consumers state that 
YouTube-style AVoD does not represent an alternative to Netflix-style PVoD for 
them, the consumption habits described by the respondents indicate the opposite 
for prime time consumption. In general, the results support that consumers with 
limited time capacities need to decide between competing ways to get entertained. 
Especially the decision of evening and prime time entertainment is not trivial and 
shows that consumers do not clearly prefer one distinctive medium, displaying a 
strong competitive relation. In contrast, consumption of specific genres, for in-
stance, sports or news hints at less competitive relations.  
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 summarizes the pro and contra reasons 
for these different audiovisual online streaming services being alternatives for us-
ers. Then, section 3 presents our survey data and the empirical analysis. Based upon 
the results, section 4 discusses implications and section 5 concludes. 
2. Audiovisual Markets and Competition
The ongoing process of digitization and the spread of broadband internet technol-
ogy considerably increased the option for consumers to watch moving audiovisual 
contents. Traditional television – irrespective of its transmission media (terrestrial, 
cable, satellite, online, etc.) – now facing video-on-demand services changes the 
competitive landscape. This may be good news since in many national television 
markets (including Germany), concentration and (a lack of) competition have been 
continuous concerns (Budzinski & Wacker 2007; Bundeskartellamt 2011a,b, 2015; 
OFCOM 2018). However, the competitive interrelations between TV and VoD as 
well as among different types of VoD services are subject to controversial discus-
3  Please note, since these answers are not revealed preferences of actual consumption behavior, 
but descriptions on their behavior by the respondents, we consider them as pseudo-revealed. For 
a discussion of stated and revealed preferences in online media from an economic perspective, 
see Budzinski & Kuchinke (2020). 
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sion4 - and as mentioned in section 1, most empirical studies ignore YouTube when 
they discuss VoD markets.  
Although on first sight all types of services provide audiovisual contents and, thus, 
serve the same needs of the consumers, a number of issues are raised that may lim-
it the intensity of competition between them.  
• An often-raised objection claims a service like YouTube (AVoD) does not
compete with the likes of traditional TV and PVoDs like Netflix because its
content is predominantly non-professional and/or non-commercial (inter alia,
Bruns 2008; Ritzer & Jurgenson 2010; Bundeskartellamt 2011a, 2015; Denn-
hardt 2014; Fuchs 2014). According to this view, YouTube mainly represents
a social media platform where users upload content for other users (cat vid-
eos, fail videos, etc.), i.e. a sort of user-exchange of contents, and profes-
sional contents from business companies are in the clear minority. The na-
ture of YouTube’s early ‘user generated content’ (from users for users) has
changed a lot and initial ‘private’ uploaders professionalized towards being
active content providers, offering regular video uploads regarding specific
topics according to the channels media concept (Döring 2014; Budzinski &
Gaenssle 2018). Notwithstanding the still existing type of non-professional
content, this trend of professionalization points towards the significant
turnovers and revenues that content providers like so-called social media
stars5 earn through participation on YouTube’s advertisement revenues as
well as through product placements – with the latter further emphasizing
the commercial nature of the content supply (Budzinski & Gaenssle 2018;
Gaenssle & Budzinski 2020). Nowadays, a significant share, if not most of
the views on YouTube, fall on commercial content, most of which is profes-
sionally produced; the most popular 20 percent receive 97 percent of views
(Ding et al. 2011) and 10-30 percent of videos have fewer than ten views
(Chowdhury & Makaroff 2013).
4  Less than a decade ago, the Federal Cartel Office of Germany (Bundeskartellamt) denied the ex-
istence of relevant competitive pressure from YouTube on German television channels (Bun-
deskartellamt 2011a,b, 2015; Budzinski & Lindstädt-Dreusicke 2020).  
5  Social media stars (so-called: influencers, creators, micro-celebrities, online stars, etc.) are suc-
cessful content providers on social media platforms like YouTube or Instagram (for a detailed 
analysis see Gaenssle & Budzinski 2020). 
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• Content differences between the different types of services represent a sec-
ond aspect. While YouTube is known to predominantly provide shorter vide-
os (e.g. short clips, music videos & social media star entertainment), both 
Netflix and TV focus on longer pieces like movies, series and shows. The con-
tent differences may go along with different ways of consumption. For quick 
information (specific tutorials/help, etc.) or social network elements (i.e. fol-
low stars or friends, sharing content), YouTube meets the consumers’ prefer-
ences, whereas for full-length video content the choice falls on the other 
types of services. Therefore, YouTube may be more relevant for purposes like 
bypassing waiting or travelling times, covering smaller breaks and shorter 
entertainment spaces, etc., whereas PVoDs like Netflix and TV are preferred 
for filling an evening of entertainment or a free Sunday afternoon, for in-
stance. As such, the services would rather complement each other than 
compete with each other. These differences in contents and consumption 
could reflect in service usages different times of day: Netflix and TV should 
be the prime-time competitors according to this view, whereas YouTube is 
more a media for “in-between” moments throughout the rest of the day. 
However, with the professionalization of AVoD content, average video 
length is developing towards traditional video formats. A study conducted 
by the search engine Pex (Turek 2019) shows that average YouTube videos 
are 11.7min long (December 2018), with popular categories reaching up to 
25min on average (gaming 24.7min; film & animation 19.2min). Moreover, 
serial consumption of videos and so-called binge watching (Rubenking et al. 
2018; Gaenssle & Kunz-Kaltenhäuser 2020) allows consumers to watch hours 
of video content without interruption – a phenomenon that is further fueled 
by individualized recommendation systems and auto-play modes.6 Inde-
pendent of the single video length, this may result in hours of successive 
consumption; accumulating to a total consumption length, which is easily 
comparable to full-length movies. These developments show converging 
trends and increasing comparability of services. 
                                                             
6  The platform Twitch (twitch.tv), for instance, allows content providers 24 hours streaming. 
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• A further difference may relate to the device of usage. One expects consum-
ers of traditional television programs or Netflix (PVoD) to prefer large televi-
sion screens, while YouTube-style AVoD services are mostly watched on mo-
bile devices (laptops, tablets and, particularly, smartphones). However, due
to the possibility of downloading content to mobile devices and watching it
‘on the road’, consumers may start to watch their favorite shows – regard-
less of the original service (AVoD, PVoD or TV) – while e.g. traveling to work.
• Eventually, social networking elements like commenting, sharing or liking
content may represent a differentiator. This social media function is usually
not possible for linear TV, although broadcasters recently started to increase
audience engagement e.g. in live shows with audience questions or the pos-
sibility of writing (WhatsApp) messages. Nevertheless, due to the nature of
the non-linear availability of content, audience ratings, comments, and
shares are possible on AVoD and PVoD. Especially AVoD pages like YouTube
or Twitch have networking elements and very active ‘below video comment-
ing behavior’. However, former non-digital players in the market also adapt
to new possibilities and try to increase audience engagement.
Overall, the different services seem to converge and try to use all possible ways to 
increase the time recipients spent consuming their content. Attention may be a 
scarce resource and, in the face of information overflow due to omnipresent mobile 
access to the internet, a relevant one for online content consumption (Falkinger 
2008; Evans 2013; Boik et al. 2017). According to the economics of attention, all 
content providers compete for the scarce attention of the users who can spend 
every minute of their attention only once. Therefore, if a user opts for watching 
YouTube videos, she cannot spend this attention to a Netflix serial anymore and 
vice versa (opportunity costs). Given that many users spend a relevant time of any 
day for working, sleeping, and other activities (childcare, sports, etc.), competition 
for the remaining time for watching audiovisual online content may be intense. 
Furthermore, even though there are differences in detail, a large part of content 
and consumption regarding all three types of services is about entertainment and, 
thus, referring to the same underlying intention or want of the consumer. 
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While the reasoning so far has focused on possible differences between YouTube 
on the one side and both TV and Netflix-style services on the other side, the case 
for the latter two being in competition with each other appears to be more 
straightforward. In a way, services like Netflix may be viewed to be the “new TV”, 
entailing the advantages of traditional TV and adding the luxury to be non-linear, 
so that users do not depend on a given program schedule anymore but can cherry 
pick their times and contents. Therefore, it may mainly be a generation effect sepa-
rating the two types of services with older generations just being slower to adapt 
to a superior new good.  
However, while enhanced choice options will mostly benefit consumers’ prefer-
ences, there can be exceptions to that. Choosing does require investing cognitive 
capacity and in some situations in life – like the end of an exhausting day where 
someone just looks for some relaxing entertainment before going to sleep or back-
ground entertainment without active engagement (like radio consumption is often 
done) – users may not want to spend these resources. Then, a linear service like TV 
may be superior. Linear TV programming demands, thus, less cognitive engage-
ment and decisiveness. Moreover, regular television consumers might enjoy the 
feeling of being connected to society, watching what other people nationwide are 
also watching, i.e. networking and commonality effects as well as cultural inclusion 
by e.g. national popular TV shows. And finally, the bundling of information and 
entertainment, e.g. news and prime-time movie as a bundle, may be valued by 
consumers, and be very tiresome to self-compile (or even impossible due to lack of 
supply) on PVoD and AVoD.  
The algorithm-based recommendation service of Netflix and co. may substitute for 
the linear program schedule in such cases. Based on individual data, recommender 
systems provide content suggestions for (indecisive) consumers. To simplify the 
demand-process and lower the cost of active consumption decisions, services use 
auto-play modes (immediately starting the next video), content suggestions, trail-
ers, etc.  
Altogether, the theoretical reasoning does not yield a clear picture and, therefore, 
emphasizes the relevance of an empirical analysis. This empirical analysis must con-
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sider that the intensity of competition may vary with factors like age, intention, 
genre, or time of day.  
3. Empirical Analysis of Audiovisual Media Consumption
3.1 Methodology and Data 
3.1.1 Sampling and Data 
The data used for the empirical analysis originates from an online survey conducted 
from November 2018 until February 2019 in Germany (by Ilmenau University of 
Technology and the Business School at Pforzheim University). It is an academically 
motivated study, independent of external funding or other heteronomous interests. 
The standardized quantitative online questionnaire was specifically designed to 
match the research questions mentioned above. We attracted 3,882 registered vis-
its, of whom 3,277 started the questionnaire, to eventually reach N = 2,920 valid 
finishers. The students, who were responsible for the sampling, executed the re-
cruitment and invitations to the questionnaire, i.e. spreading it mainly among their 
peers (young people and older relatives). The survey participation was predomi-
nantly voluntarily, although driven by social obligations towards the students con-
ducting it. At Pforzheim University ‘StudiQUEST’ a panel of students and alumni 
was involved. Moreover, the invitation to the questionnaire was placed at the land-
ing page of ‘serienjunkies.de’ for a week in January 2019. All parts of Germany are 
represented within the sample; however, the states of origin are over-represented 
(with 650 from Ilmenau and surrounding, and 661 from Pforzheim and surround-
ing). The average age of respondents is 31.55 years (min: 10; max: 83); with 48.15 
percent male, 50.65 percent female, 1.2 percent ‘other’. Since the survey was con-
ducted in a university environment, the sample is biased towards a young, highly 
educated, low-income group; 56.4 percent have an income lower than EUR 1,500.7 
The educational level is displayed in table 1 and shows that 29.62 percent have a 
university entrance qualification and 42.5 percent a university degree. 
7  See appendix 1 and 2 for detailed information on income and age groups. 
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Table 1: Educational Level Sample 
International Education Status Freq. Percent Cum. 
without educational degree 10 0.34 0.34 
secondary school degree 211 7.23 7.57 
university entrance qualification 865 29.62 37.19 
Apprenticeship 477 16.34 53.53 
university degree 1,241 42.50 96.03 
PhD 78 2.67 98.70 
no response 38 1.30 100.00 
Total 2,920 100.00  
 
The representativeness of the sample cannot be guaranteed for all relevant aspects 
of the analysis and cannot be compared to well-structured cluster sampling. Not-
withstanding, given the sample size, we find both variance and randomness to 
meet statistical requirements. It provides information on stated and pseudo-
revealed preferences of the participants and if/how, they diverge. Moreover, the 
over-sampling within young age groups can be used in favor of the analysis, as es-
pecially young adults use VoD offers.8 For the analysis of competition between 
online services more information on consumers, who know and actually use all ser-
vices, is very valuable. These trends will intensify over time with growing numbers 
of young generations and changing consumption habits.  
 
3.1.2 Data Analysis and Variables  
The questionnaire comprises of 13 content-related separate questions (excluding 
demographic questions, like age, gender, etc.), two of which ask for the frequency 
of media usage (different services and devices). To answer our research questions, 
the consumption of video content via the different services is crucial. Which service 
is used at what time and how much content is consumed? The frequency (i.e. how 
often consumers use the service) and the duration (i.e. how much time they spend 
consuming video content) are relevant to analyze the extent of usage and im-
                                                             
8  See section 1 as well as Kupferschmitt (2018) for Germany, Statista (2018) for the US, and 
Lindstädt-Dreusicke & Budzinski (2020) for a supportive economic analysis. 
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portance of the respective service. Therefore, we are interested in the consumption 
intensity depending on the respective type of media service 
and construct a pseudo-metric dependent variable for the analytical analysis: 
(1) 
(2) 
If services compete for the consumer’s attention, it is a question of time allocation. 
The intensity of usage represents the time spend on consumption, as pictured in 
figure 1, the consumer can either spent more time within one sitting (B) or shorter 
sittings with higher frequency (A). The exposure to content and time allocated to 
consumption is the same in both cases. 
Figure 1: Consumption Intensity of Service i 
frequency
duration
intensity
The frequency of usage is measured on a seven-point scale from high to low fre-
quency (6 = several times daily; 0 = never) for each service, supplemented by the 
option ‘no response’. The duration of video consumption in one sitting, i.e. how 
long without taking a break or switching activity, was also measured for each ser-
vice separately. By moving a regulator on a scale from ‘0’ to ‘> 3h’ (in seven steps), 
the respondents could state the length of one average sitting. The multiplication of 
the variables gives us a range of 25 points (0 = never, 24 = several times daily, 
more than three hours). The intensity of the usage can thus be expressed by the 
new dependent variable on a range from non-users (never), over medium-users 
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(e.g. monthly, on average one hour) to heavy-users (several times daily, more than 
three hours).  
Four independent variables are used for the analysis: (1) intention of usage (enter-
tainment, shorten waiting time, stimulate knowledge, personal motivation (i.e. ca-
reer/health)), (2) genre (feature film, documentary, series, tutorial, sports, news, 
comedy, music videos), (3) time of day (of service ; noon, afternoon, evening9), (4) 
information on individuals  (age category, gender, education). 
Since we are not only interested in the factors explaining the intensity of consump-
tion, but the interaction between the different services, i.e. competitive relations 
between YouTube, Netflix and TV, we decide to perform a seemingly unrelated re-
gression estimation (SURE) (Zellner 1962; Zellner & Huang 1962; Zellner 1963). This 
method is commonly used for supply and demand models. Our model consists of 
three regression estimations, each with its own dependent variable (for the respec-
tive services ). While every equation can be seen as an independent linear regres-
sion and can be estimated separately, error terms are expected to be correlated 
across equations. As such, it is a system of linear equations with error terms that 
are correlated across equations for a given individual but not across individuals. 
When the models do not have the same set of independent variables and error 
terms are correlated, SURE can lead to more efficient results than separate OLS (or-
dinary least square) estimations. Moreover, it is suitable to perform joint tests. 
The model consists of  linear regression equations for  
individuals. The th equation for individual  is 
(3)  
Stacking all observations, the model for the th equation is 
(4)  
 
                                                             
9  Multiple answers were possible. We excluded “morning” and “night” due to multi-collinearity. 
Moreover, these periods do not add more information on competitive relations from a theoreti-
cal point of view (see figure 5 for an overview between daytimes).  
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Here, the error terms  are allowed to be correlated to estimate a full variance-
covariance matrix of coefficients. 
In addition to the econometric analysis, we use direct questions to show stated 
preferences in descriptive statistics (see 3.2.1). Two questions in the survey feature 
item batteries (six items each) of attitude measurement with five-point Likert scales 
(1 = disagree to 5 = agree; 6 = no response). In accordance with findings of Revil-
la et al. (2014), who found that five-point scales are statistically equivalent (in 
terms of validity and efficiency) to seven-point or larger scales, we find five-points 
scales intuitive for respondents and analysis.  
3.2 Results and Discussion 
3.2.1 Descriptive Statistics and Results 
To understand the motives of consumers and their personal perception, we directly 
ask them on their agreement on a five-point Likert scale (description see 3.1.2). 
Among the questions of (dis-)agreement, we asked if respondents agreed that (i) 
YouTube (AVoD) is an alternative to Netflix (PVoD), (ii) Netflix (PVoD) is an alterna-
tive to TV, and (iii) YouTube (AVoD) is an alternative to Netflix (PVoD). In doing so, 
consumers are directly asked for their opinion and state their preferences for video 
consumption. A detailed presentation of answers within the different age groups 
reveals interesting results. 
(i) The answers to the question whether YouTube-style AVoD is an alternative
for TV are rather dichotomous. In total 38.59 percent tend to disagree,
12.71 percent are neutral, and 48.05 percent tend to agree (0.65 percent
‘no response’). Looking at the age groups the difference is apparent with
38.89 percent of people older than 60 years strongly disagreeing and 49.04
percent younger than 19 years strongly agreeing (figure 2). The results
show deep differences between far end age groups and their consumption
behavior.
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Figure 2: AVoD-TV Alternatives 
 
(ii) When it comes to Netflix-style PVoD versus TV, the answers are much more 
homogenous, since most consumers in our sample tend to perceive them 
as close alternatives and strongly agree (figure 3). Again, only those older 
than 60 years express a strong opinion against PVoD being an alternative to 
TV. 
 
Figure 3: PVoD-TV Alternatives 
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(iii) Lastly, the relationship between YouTube-style AVoD and Netflix-style PVoD
is shown in figure 4. There is no considerable difference between age
groups and the results are comparatively heterogeneous. In total more re-
spondents seem to disagree with AVoD and PVoD serving a similar purpose;
58 percent disagreement, 15.55 percent neutral, 22.91 percent agreement
(7.74 percent of which strongly), and 3.46 percent ‘no response’. Thus, in
our sample, considerably fewer people think of YouTube as an alternative
to watching Netflix (about 23 percent) than to watching TV (about 48 per-
cent). Still, it is quite surprising that almost 23 percent of respondents with-
in the sample agree to AVoD and PVoD being alternatives for one another.
Figure 4: AVoD-PVoD Alternatives 
Switching from how the respondents assessed the different services when directly 
asked to the more detailed self-description of their consumption behavior reveals 
interesting patterns. Most consumers spend their evening time to consume video 
content, apparently actively choosing between the respective services. Figure 5 dis-
plays daytimes and total number of respondents using the service at that time 
(multiple answers possible). Note that n=2,920. In other words, more than 70 per-
cent of the respondents in our sample indicate that they use all three services 
18 
 
(YouTube, Netflix, TV) for evening video consumption. Therefore, while consumers 
consider the services to be different, they still choose between them as alternatives 
to consume audiovisual contents in the evening. Consequently, AVoD, PVoD and TV 
seem to compete for the consumers’ attention during peak times of consumption 
and standard leisure time (prime time entertainment), whereas things look differ-
ent at other times of day. 
 
Figure 5: Daytime Usage 
 
Summing up, the descriptive results show that there is no strict line between the 
different services, although most consumers agree to PVoD being an alternative for 
TV. Among younger generations AVoD seems to be a better alternative to TV than 
for older generations. The results for PVoD and AVoD are mixed. Consumers state 
to use the services for different reasons, yet, when it comes to the time they spend 
on consumption, the services seem to be in close competition for the consumers 
attention during prime time in the evening (but not at other times during the day). 
Altogether, the descriptive results are not fully conclusive. A detailed analysis with 
more sophisticated methods is necessary to verify the results. 
 
3.2.2 Econometric Analysis and Results 
By the means of seemingly unrelated regression estimations (see 3.1.2 for details 
on the SURE model), we analyze the influence of different intentions, genres, times 
of day, and individual characteristics (age, education, gender) on consumption in-
tensity of (1) AVoD, (2) PVoD, and (3) TV. Table 2 displays the results for one mod-
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el, the three different dependent variables (1-3) in the columns next to each oth-
er.10 Due to filter questions, only  observations are taken into account.  
Table 2: Results AVoD, PVoD & TV 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES AVoD PVoD TV 
Intention: Entertainment 0.033 -2.852 -2.396
(1.960) (1.760) (2.451)
Intention: Shorten Waiting Time 0.093 0.709*** 0.249
(0.250) (0.225) (0.314)
Intention: Stimulate Knowledge 1.157*** -0.425* -0.915***
(0.271) (0.243) (0.340)
Intention: Personal Motivation 1.549*** -0.217 -1.170***
(0.297) (0.268) (0.373)
Genre: Feature Films -0.346 2.226*** 1.614**
(0.529) (0.473) (0.662)
Genre: Documentary 0.077 0.074 -0.355
(0.314) (0.282) (0.393)
Genre: Series 0.965 5.539*** -1.055
(0.626) (0.560) (0.782)
Genre: Tutorials -0.354 0.047 -0.389
(0.264) (0.237) (0.331)
Genre: Sports -0.662*** 0.173 1.990***
(0.257) (0.230) (0.319)
Genre: News -0.659** -0.324 2.160***
(0.289) (0.259) (0.360)
Genre: Comedy 0.862*** 0.327 0.056
(0.265) (0.237) (0.332)
Genre: Music Videos 0.915*** 0.207 -0.166
(0.259) (0.233) (0.325)
Time of Day AVoD Noon 0.423 -0.229
(0.306) (0.431)
Time of Day AVoD Afternoon -0.098 -0.060
(0.231) (0.332)
Time of Day AVoD Evening -1.169*** 0.061
(0.250) (0.351)
Time of Day PVoD Noon -0.366 -0.013
(0.537) (0.676)
Time of Day PVoD Afternoon 0.828*** 0.279
(0.296) (0.368)
10  We performed regression specification tests on separate OLS regressions (each dependent varia-
ble separately) to check the applicability. Especially multi-collinearity was of concern, but the var-
iance inflation factors (VIFs) for the independent variables show values below five for each linear 
regression. Moreover, we checked if all equations together are statistically significant. The 
Breusch-Pagan test of independence shows that, for the same individuals, the correlation of the 
residuals is significant and we can reject the hypothesis that this correlation is zero. 
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Time of Day PVoD Evening -1.105**  -0.702 
 (0.531)  (0.667) 
Time of Day TV Noon 0.026 -0.137  
 (0.544) (0.485)  
Time of Day TV Afternoon -0.375 0.114  
 (0.331) (0.286)  
Time of Day TV Evening -1.750*** -1.366***  
 (0.284) (0.255)  
Age Categories = 2, 20-29 -1.858*** 0.009 -0.687 
 (0.552) (0.498) (0.695) 
Age Categories = 3, 30-39 -3.033*** 0.427 1.037 
 (0.600) (0.542) (0.757) 
Age Categories = 4, 40-49 -4.346*** 0.526 2.754*** 
 (0.660) (0.596) (0.832) 
Age Categories = 5, 50-59 -4.585*** -0.844 4.342*** 
 (0.736) (0.665) (0.926) 
Age Categories = 6, > 60 -5.145*** -2.128* 4.611*** 
 (1.216) (1.095) (1.534) 
Gender = 1, female -2.610*** -0.568** 1.879*** 
 (0.264) (0.239) (0.333) 
Gender = 2, other 0.381 0.256 -0.318 
 (1.213) (1.089) (1.521) 
International Education Status = 2, secondary school degree -2.295 0.240 0.732 
 (2.437) (2.185) (3.054) 
International Education Status = 3, university entrance qualification -2.824 -0.356 -1.080 
 (2.408) (2.159) (3.019) 
International Education Status = 4, apprenticeship -3.609 0.661 -0.058 
 (2.424) (2.174) (3.040) 
International Education Status = 5, university degree -4.411* -0.646 -1.032 
 (2.411) (2.163) (3.023) 
International Education Status = 6, PhD -5.430** -2.079 0.091 
 (2.568) (2.302) (3.218) 
International Education Status = 7, no response -4.467* -0.004 0.084 
 (2.624) (2.352) (3.287) 
    
Constant 17.901*** 13.694*** 10.746*** 
 (3.163) (2.809) (3.959) 
    
Observations 2,333 2,333 2,333 
R-squared 0.177 0.111 0.099 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Results intention: We asked for the different intentions consumers have for watch-
ing video content. While getting entertained is one of the main intentions, the re-
sults are not significant in our model, approximately due to lack of variance in the 
answers. However, other results show significant coefficients. At the first glance 
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surprisingly, ‘shorten waiting time’ is significantly positive for Netflix-style PVoD, 
while it is not for YouTube-style AVoD. This appears to be counterintuitive because 
based on the theoretical reasoning (see section 2), one would expect a lot of mo-
bile and ‘on the road’ usage of YouTube-style services. Yet, an explanation could be 
that many users download videos from Netflix or Amazon and watch them while 
traveling on the bus/train etc. Mobile internet connection in Germany is often lim-
ited (Briglauer et al. 2019), so traveling to work or long distances might lead 
through “dead spots” without sufficient signal strength. Regarding ‘stimulating 
knowledge’, research and learning are closely connected to YouTube usage, which 
can explain the positive results for ‘stimulating knowledge’ on AVoD. In that re-
gard, PVoD and TV do not seem to compete with YouTube & Co, as the results for 
those services are significantly negative. The same is true for ‘motivation’ and TV. 
Consumers who seek motivation (e.g., health or career) use YouTube-like services, 
whereas the coefficient for TV is negative regarding this aspect. 
Results genre: ‘Feature films’ are significantly positive for the intensity of usage of 
both Netflix and TV. Therefore, it can be expected that the services compete for 
consumer attention, when they are choosing full-length feature films. However, the 
preferences for ‘series’ on Netflix-style PVoD are obvious. ‘Sports’ are significantly 
negative on AVoD, whereas significantly positive on TV, which could be due to lack 
of supply on YouTube & Co rather than lack of demand. This is similar to ‘news’ 
and the opposite direction to ‘music videos’. A discussion of the issue of limited 
supply of one genre on certain services is provided in section 4. ‘Comedy’ is positive 
for YouTube-style AVoD consumption intensity. While comedy can also be found in 
traditional television and on PVoD, participants in our study seem to prefer AVoD 
channels.  
Time of day: Interestingly, and in accordance with descriptive results, there seems 
to be intensive competition for prime time consumption. When asking the partici-
pants about the time of consumption during the day, multiple answers for the dif-
ferent services were possible. There are no significant results for the time around 
noon. On the one hand, the preference to watch PVoD in the afternoon increases 
the probability of AVoD consumption intensity. On the other hand, in the evening 
the PVoD consumption has negative impact on AVoD consumption. The other way 
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around, AVoD evening preferences negatively influence PVoD consumption. More-
over, prime time television choices negatively affect both AVoD and PVoD. These 
analytical results confirm the descriptive results in chapter 3.2.1 and show that ser-
vices compete for the consumers’ attention – despite differing contents. If consum-
ers simply want to get entertained, they seem to choose among all of the three ser-
vices in their free time (primarily prime time in the evening). 
Results age categories: The base group for age is 10-19 years. The negative coeffi-
cients show that all older age groups use relatively less YouTube-style AVoD, which 
thus is the “youngest” service among the three. There are no statistically significant 
results for Netflix-style PVoD, except for the group older than 60 years, who gener-
ally do not prefer to watch VoD services. TV shows opposing effects, since expecta-
bly older age groups tend to watch more television than younger ones. Thus, our 
results match other, more representative studies (summarized in section 1) with 
respect to generation effects, increasing confidence in the results of our study 
which is not that representative but digs deeper into the topic. 
In summary, the results of the empirical analysis show that (i) services compete for 
prime time attention of consumers, supporting the descriptive findings (see 3.2.1); 
(ii) show that ‘intention’ and preferred ‘genre’ mostly vary between services, yet, 
consumers like to get entertained by all of them,11 and (iii) concerning age groups, 
younger people actively choose AVoD channels, supporting the results of more rep-
resentative studies. In the light of the ongoing dynamic development of online VoD 
service-offerings, competition between services seems likely to increase in the 
course of time.  
 
4. Summary and Limitations 
Theoretical reasoning suggests that types of services that are more similar to each 
other should stand in closer competition than more dissimilar services (see section 
2). Given the state of the German market at the time of the survey, this would im-
ply to expect that content-wise TV and PVoD à la Netflix are close competitors. 
Whereas YouTube as the main AVoD outlet is less of an alternative to TV, with the 
                                                             
11  2,893 out of 2,920 participants choose at least one of the services to get entertained. 
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AVoD-PVoD interrelation maybe to be expected somewhere in-between as they 
share the non-linear character despite of content differences. Some results of the 
econometric analysis in fact show limited competition between YouTube and TV, 
e.g. the intention to stimulate knowledge, or finding personal motivation in video
content. In both cases respondents favor AVoD and not TV. There is also a strong
preference for Netflix-style PVoD when it comes to serial content, thus, competitive
relations seem rather weak in this case in our sample. The analytical analysis further
shows that the intensity of competition between the three types of services is not
so clear at daytime. Here, users appear to use them not so much as alternatives.
This is further supported by the results for the intention to bypass “waiting time”,
where our respondents clearly prefer one type of service – and not the one that
theory would suggest (Netflix instead of YouTube). Not surprisingly, older genera-
tions strongly stick to traditional television, which merely points to a time-lag in the
competition of newer technology-based services.
However, our empirical analysis shows that roughly 48 percent of the respondents 
view YouTube to be an alternative for TV (ranging from almost 20 percent among 
the over 60 years old to almost 70 percent from the below 20 years old; see section 
3.2.1) – despite the strong differences in content. Notably, a strong minority of ap-
prox. 39 percent disagrees (ranging from more than 65 percent in the oldest to less 
than 20 percent in the youngest age group). Since our sample is biased towards 
younger and well-educated respondents, it can be expected that the disagreement 
figure may be higher in a more representative sample – for now, as in the course of 
time, the development will trend towards our results (emphasizing the now young-
er generations). Notwithstanding, the results make it hard to argue that YouTube is 
not exerting competitive pressure on traditional TV as some are claiming (see sec-
tion 2). Our results expectably indicate to Netflix-type VoD services and TV being 
close competitors, whereas the picture for YouTube vs. Netflix is not so clear with 
58 percent stating the view that they do not represent alternatives and almost 23 
percent stating they do (without significant difference among the age groups; see 
section 3.2.1). However, at the same time, asked what medium they consume at 
prime time, for each type of service 70.6 percent or more of the respondents con-
24 
 
firmed consumption.12 The consequent indication that all three services compete 
for prime time attention is confirmed by analytical econometrics (see section 3.2.2). 
Thus, actual behavior (pseudo-revealed preferences through indirect questions) ap-
pears to show closer competition among the service types than (more directly) 
stated preferences. 
Altogether, competitive pressure among Netflix, traditional TV and YouTube cannot 
be ignored when considering the development of markets for audiovisual contents 
– be it for competition policy or other purposes. Particularly, excluding YouTube 
from (analyses of) TV and/or VoD markets appears to inappropriate in this respect 
as it exerts considerable competition on the other two (types of) services. Especially 
for younger generations the competition for attention appears to be already strong 
today and will furthermore intensify in the course of time. 
However, there are some limitations and caveats we need to consider. Some con-
tents are not present on some type of services, for instance, hardly any contempo-
rary music videos are nowadays broadcasted on TV and Netflix-style PVoD in Ger-
many.13 The same is true for news on Netflix and co. This raises the questions: (i) 
does available content drive the answer in our survey, or (ii) does the consumption 
behavior/preferences we measure explain why there is virtually no content offering? 
Unfortunately, we cannot discriminate between these two possible explanations 
with our data. Still, this limitation is only relevant for some genre categories. Fur-
thermore, anecdotic evidence for contemporary music videos shows that there was 
a considerable offer on TV (MTV, VIVA, etc.) until YouTube came up and only then 
the offer in TV started to vanish. This indicates that the non-offer may be a result of 
competition and, thus, towards explanation (ii). If this was valid, our results tend to 
underestimate the competitive pressure among the service types.  
                                                             
12  We included a question on second screen usage (i.e. parallel use of two screens) in our question-
naire. Although, younger consumers tend to engage in second screen usage like e.g. Instagram 
on the smartphone and Netflix on television at the same time, we consider the parallel usage of 
two videos to be a rare exception (mostly, due to overlapping audio tracks). Yet, future research 
is needed to investigate the phenomenon and better estimate the possibility of parallel usage. 
13  For instance, MTV still broadcasts but its program does not primarily contend of music videos 
anymore. A channel like Deluxe Music does still broadcast music videos (mostly for older genera-
tions) but is of little relevance. 
25 
With respect to news-style content, the results may reflect a dependence on the 
(perceived) quality of this type of content, about which information are not availa-
ble in our data-set. Alternatively, the large-scale public service broadcaster land-
scape in Germany may already provide the overall market volume for audiovisual 
news contents, thus leaving no space for competition from newly emerging VoD-
services, in particular given the fact that public service broadcasters (PSB) in Ger-
many can subsidize their news coverage by revenues from a tax-like fee. Here, the 
demographic bias towards high educated respondents in our sample may influence 
the results since highly educated people are said to be more likely to value high-
level (PSB-) news contents.  
Our results relate to the market offerings as they were in Germany at the time of 
the survey. For instance, the PVoD-style YouTube Premium was not relevant in 
Germany at the time of the survey (and still does not rack up considerable market 
shares at the time of writing) but may change competitive interrelations in the 
market in the future – as may other further dynamics. In particular, the entry of an 
advertising-financed Netflix-like service (contents like Netflix, revenue structure like 
free commercial TV) would represent a very different AVoD from YouTube and, 
thus, might lead to different results. Generally, the high market dynamics are likely 
to continue and may bring about a convergence of services with some players at-
tempting to provide a one-stop shop for audiovisual consumption (e.g. Alphabet 
adding YouTube stories à la Instagram, video rental à la Amazon and premium sub-
scription à la Netflix to its core AVoD business). These dynamics may further change 
competitive interrelations as well. Based on our analysis, we predict that further 
dynamics further increase the intensity of competition among services.  
Finally, our results can only be seen as ‘indication’, since the sample is not repre-
sentative in size, nature and scope. We have no data on ‘real’ consumption behav-
ior, but personal statements about and estimations of consumption habits. It 
would be interesting to compare these results with data from YouTube or Netflix to 
see if actual consumption behavior and self-reporting match. However, since data 
is of major importance in that market and represents a relevant business secret, a 
publication by the companies cannot be expected. Future and complementary re-
search might still find ways to track actual consumer behavior and analyze the 
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(changing) dynamics in the field. Naturally, since it is the first empirical study on 
competition in VoD markets, follow up research and re-sampling are necessary to 
verify results. 
 
5. Conclusion and Implications 
The landscape of audiovisual content offerings and consumption is rapidly chang-
ing. Not long ago, it was dominated by linear television, transmitted terrestrially, 
through cable networks or via satellite. Recently, streaming services like Netflix, 
YouTube, Amazon Prime and others have emerged as new suppliers of audiovisual 
content. In this quickly changing industry, competition interrelations between the 
different formats are subject to controversy, in particular, with respect to YouTube 
exerting competitive pressure on services like Netflix and traditional TV. Based upon 
a survey with almost 3,000 participants, we provide an empirical analysis of con-
sumption behavior of audiovisual contents. Using descriptive and analytical statis-
tics, including multiple equation models, we are able to provide answers for and 
insights into our research questions. With respect to our general research question 
whether relevant competitive pressure between the services (in our study repre-
sented by YouTube, Netflix, TV) exists, our analysis demonstrates that all three 
(types of) services stand in competition with each other. Neglecting one type, like 
for instance YouTube, leads to a misrepresentation of competitive forces in the 
markets for audiovisual contents and to misleading interpretations. However, our 
rich data-set allows us to look deeper into the matter and specify the general re-
search question by, more precisely, inquiring whether the intensity of competitive 
pressure depends on specific characteristics of demand, i.e. (i) for whom (e.g. age 
groups), (ii) during what time of the day (e.g. prime time), and (iii) for what pur-
poses (e.g. genre, motivation/intention).  
Regarding age groups, the battle between YouTube, Netflix and traditional TV 
mainly takes place regarding the younger generations for whom these services rep-
resent close alternatives, whereas older generations remain more focused on TV, 
probably due to a lack of adoption of new technologies. This also hints at further 
increasing competitive pressure among the services in the course of time. While 
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these results confirm less detailed but sample-wise more representative studies, our 
result regarding different times of day represent novel insights. Our analysis shows 
that all three services strongly compete for prime-time consumption, i.e. the vast 
majority of consumers actively chooses between all three types when it comes to 
watch video content in the evening. However, our results for other times of day are 
mixed and insignificant. With respect to consumer intentions, we can show that 
the respondents in our sample preferred Netflix over the other two when it comes 
to “shortening waiting time”, which represents a counterintuitive result to the ex-
pectation that YouTube would dominate this intention category. 
Altogether and notwithstanding the general results of competitive pressure among 
all three types of services, our detailed analysis identifies pockets of more and such 
of less intensive competition within the battle among YouTube, Netflix and tradi-
tional TV. Furthermore, in some genres like sports, music video or news content, 
some of the services provide only remote or virtually no content. This may be the 
consequence of an overriding competitive advantage of one media type in this gen-
re or due to the nature of the service type. However, in any case, the competitive 
pressure is comparably low in these cases – today. The ongoing dynamics of the an-
alyzed markets imply that also competitive interrelations may be subject to further 
change in the future. 
Our analysis yields important implications for the effects of cooperations, alliances, 
mergers and acquisitions in audiovisual content markets. It is not sufficient to point 
to differences in content or an alleged (and however defined) professionalism of 
content producers in order to assume a lack of competitive pressure. Also, features 
and characteristics of consumption behavior und competition from traditional TV 
markets can not readily be applied to more – offline and online – audiovisual con-
tent markets. Eventually, a general “they all compete because they all provide audi-
ovisual content” would also be to superficial. Instead, our analysis demonstrates 
that audiovisual content providers act in a heterogeneous market where some sup-
pliers may be closer competitors to each than to others (unilateral oligopoly effects; 
Kaplow & Shapiro 2007; Froeb & Werden 2008; Kerber & Schwalbe 2008; Keating & 
Willig 2015). Furthermore, consumption behavior is so differentiated that these in-
terrelations may differ across, inter alia, daytimes, consumer intentions, and genres. 
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Thus, a careful analysis of the actual competitive effects is necessary when assessing 
joint venture projects or mergers and acquisitions among these players, including 
vertical effects (which are not part of our analysis; but see e.g. Stöhr et al. 2020). 
Moreover, unilateral business strategies need to be observed and considered as well, 
in particular, if these strategies aim at or result in a walled garden type of offering, 
i.e. proceed in the direction of a closed ecosystem protected against outside (maver-
ick) competition. This is necessary in order to sustain dynamic competition among 
audiovisual content providers and maintain a diverse, pluralistic, and preference-
conformal landscape. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1:  Sample Income 
Income Freq. Percent Cum. 
no response 498 17.05 17.05 
below 500 Euro 416 14.25 31.30 
500 - 999 Euro 455 15.58 46.88 
1.000 - 1.499 Euro 278 9.52 56.40 
1.500 - 2.499 Euro 672 23.01 79.42 
2.500 - 2.999 Euro 241 8.25 87.67 
3.000 - 3.499 Euro 145 4.97 92.64 
3.500 - 3.999 Euro 84 2.88 95.51 
4.000 - 4.499 Euro 47 1.61 97.12 
4.500 - 4.999 Euro 28 0.96 98.08 
5.000 Euro and more 56 1.92 100.00 
Total 2,920 100.00  
 
 
Appendix 2: Sample Age Groups 
Age Freq. Percent Cum. 
10-19 157 5.38 5.38 
20-29 1,442 49.38 54.76 
30-39 696 23.84 78.60 
40-49 338 11.58 90.17 
50-59 215 7.36 97.53 
> 60 72 2.47 100.00 
Total 2,920 100.00  
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